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RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of
Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency
Problems
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),' the culmination of its effort to develop
new legal remedies to curtail the incidence of sophisticated crime in
the United States.2 A person may fall within the ambit of RICO's
prohibitions by engaging in one or more of four activities: (1) using
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an
interest in an enterprise;3 (2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;4 (3) con-
ducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity;5 or (4) conspiring to commit any of these offenses.6 The
"pattern of racketeering activity" must include at least two predicate
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). RICO is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 81 Stat. 941 (1970).
2 The purpose of RICO is stated on the face of the statute:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by estab-
lishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new rem-
edies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
The Supreme Court has considered RICO only once, in United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576 (1981). The Court recognized that "the legislative history forcefully supports the
view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime." Id at 584.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce . ...
"Enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other le-
gal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). In Turkette, the Supreme Court held that "enterprise"
includes both legitimate and illegitimate associations. 452 U.S. at 584.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activi-
ties of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
5 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
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offenses 7 committed within a period of ten years.8
The relationship between the RICO substantive offenses and the
predicate offenses is critical for two issues that can arise in RICO
prosecutions: the issues of double jeopardy 9 and verdict
consistency. 10
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
6 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to vio-
late any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
7 "Racketeering activity" includes murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs, chargeable under state law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and any act indictable under statutes
concerning bribery, sports bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipment, embezzle-
ment from pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions, transmission of gam-
bling information, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations,
obstruction of state or local law enforcement, interference with commerce, robbery or extor-
tion, racketeering, illegal gambling businesses, transportation of stolen property, white slave
traffic, embezzlement of union funds, bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the
felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying or otherwise dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1).
8 A "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
9 See notes 21-115 in/ta and accompanying text.
10 See notes 116-57 in/fa and accompanying text. The relationship between the RICO
substantive offenses and the predicate offenses is implicated on yet another level: the requisite
state of mind to violate RICO. This issue is beyond the scope of this note, but for an excellent
discussion, see Kolen, Rico andState ofMind, in 3 MATERIALS ON RICO 1286 (G.R. Blakey ed.
1980).
In brief, RICO focuses on relationship. If the RICO predicate offenses are conceptual-
ized as lesser included in the RICO substantive charge, then the RICO offenses themselves
would become merely aggravated forms of the predicate offenses, and no further inquiry into
the state of mind issue would be necessary. The preferred interpretation of RICO, however,
views the substantive and predicate offenses as separate and distinct, not greater and lesser
included. See notes 13 and 55-59 in/a and accompanying text.
Some courts have held that no additional state of mind, beyond that required to violate
the predicate offenses, is required to violate RICO. See United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Unfortunately, neither of these courts adequately
analyzed the RICO statute in reaching its conclusion.
Section 1962(a) requires a defendant to knowingly use or invest capital. He must be at
least reckless as to whether the capital was income or the proceeds of income. He must be at
least reckless as to whether the income involved was from a pattern of racketeering activity.
He must be at least reckless as to whether the use or investment of his money was related to
an enterprise. No state of mind is required as to an effect on interstate commerce, since this
requirement is jurisdictional only. Kolen, supra, at 1321.
Section 1962(b) requires a defendant to knowingly engage in activities. No state of mind
is required as to whether the enterprise engages in interstate or foreign commerce, or whether
the activities of enterprise affect interstate or foreign commerce, because these elements are
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I. The Arguments Presented
Individuals convicted of a substantive RICO violation and one
or more of its predicate offenses charged as separate substantive of-
fenses consistently assert on appeal that their convictions and accom-
panying punishments violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment." They argue that RICO and its predicates are the
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, because the predicate
offenses are lesser included in the RICO substantive charge. 12 Ac-
cordingly, they urge that the double jeopardy clause prohibits succes-
sive state-federal prosecutions, successive federal prosecutions, and
separate punishments. Nevertheless, most courts have rejected these
contentions on the ground that Congress intended that RICO and
the predicate offenses be treated as separate and distinct.13 Because
Congress expressed its intent that the two offenses be treated sepa-
rately when it enacted RICO, the federal circuit courts of appeals
have rejected double jeopardy attacks on RICO prosecutions. 14
jurisdictional. The defendant must be at least reckless as to whether a relationship exists
between the distinct racketeering activities. He must be at least reckless as to his activity of
collecting a debt, but no state of mind is required as to whether the debt was lawful or
unlawful, because this is a legal question. The defendant must be at least reckless as to the
result of acquiring or maintaining his interest. Kolen, supra, at 1325-26. Section 1962(c) re-
quires the same state of mind as § 1962(b). Kolen, supra, at 1329-30. Section 1962(d) requires
the defendant to knowingly conspire to violate either § 1962(a), § 1962(b), or § 1962(c).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d
339 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980); United States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980
(1981).
12 See notes 21-59 infia and accompanying text.
13 See notes 55-59 infta and accompanying text.
14 See notes 60-115 infta and accompanying text. One commentator has recently pro-
posed the need for greater double jeopardy controls in RICO prosecutions. His position ap-
pears to be that, because the RICO statute is broad and allows much prosecutorial discretion,
prosecutors will violate the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by abusing their
power to charge defendants under RICO and their power to recommend sentences for RICO
violations. Comment, The Needfor Greater Double Jeopardy and Due Process Safeguards in RICO
Criminal and Civil Actions, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 724 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. The
author recommends strict compliance with the Petite policy, see note 70 infra and accompany-
ing text, to eliminate successive state and federal trials. He also recommends strict applica-
tion of the Blockburger test, see notes 44-54 infia and accompanying text, to obviate consecutive
punishments for RICO substantive and predicate offenses, since he doubts that Congress in-
tended RICO to warrant multiple punishments. Comment, supra, at 757.
RICO undoubtedly accords the government considerable discretion in charging, trying,
and sentencing defendants. Such discretion is necessary to implement the statute. The po-
tential for abuse of discretion is present in all facets of our criminal justice system, so citizens
must trust prosecutors not to abuse their powers under RICO. In United States v. Dot-
[December 19821
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When considering verdict consistency, however, the same courts
have been slower to conceptualize the distinct legal relationship be-
tween the RICO substantive and predicate offenses.' 5 The courts
disagree whether the RICO conviction must be reversed after an ap-
pellate court's reversal of a predicate offense charged as a substantive
crime. 16 The better reasoned opinions hold the RICO conviction
may stand.17
terweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), Justice Frankfurter remarked, "[T]he good sense of prosecu-
tors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted.
Our system of criminal justice necessarily depends on 'conscience and circumspection in pros-
ecuting officers."' Id at 285 (citing Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 378 (1912)). Any abuse
that might occur would be the fault of the individual prosecutors, not the RICO statute.
One convicted under RICO may indeed face extensive punishment. However, equally
extensive factors mitigate any abuses of discretion evident in a RICO prosecution. Even
though the elements of a RICO violation are present, the prosecuting attorney is not required
to charge the RICO violation. In fact, the Justice Department's own RICO Guidelines stress
that the statute ought not be used reflexively, but only after a carefully studied determination
that RICO is the most appropriate vehicle for prosecution. "Utilization of the RICO statute,
more so than most other Federal criminal sanctions, requires particularly careful and rea-
soned application. . . .[I]t is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively
and uniformly used." Preface, U. S. Dept. of Justice, RICO GUIDELINES 1 (1981). See also
TASK FORCE ON THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, A.B.A., The Prosecution Function, 1 AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The
Prosecution Function], for further discussion of the prosecutorial role and responsibilities.
At least four factors ensure reasoned application of RICO. First, if the prosecutor
chooses not to observe the RICO guidelines, a defendant may be able to prove the variance
necessary to establish a discriminatory prosecution action against that prosecutor. Discrimi-
natory enforcement is not a defense to the criminal charge, but. can be used when applying to
the court for a dismissal or a quashing of the prosecution on constitutional grounds. See
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973), for an excellent discussion of discrimi-
natory prosecution.
Second, the jury becomes a mitigating factor in that it may or may not convict a defend-
ant for a RICO violation, and may legitimately base its verdict on leniency or compromise.
See notes 122-39 infra and accompanying text. The jury trial itself gives the defendant "an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compli-
ant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
Third, the judge has considerable discretion in sentencing the defendant. He may
choose to impose concurrent sentences, or he may refuse to sentence for RICO violations.
Only the criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO are mandatory. See note 154 injfa and ac-
companying text.
Finally, the parole board can ease disproportionate sentences imposed by judges through
its control over parole dates. Those convicted under RICO can also seek extraordinary relief
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1361 or § 2241, when they feel the parole board has acted
arbitrarily or capriciously toward them and their terms of confinement. See, e.g., Carter v.
Carlson, 545 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Va. 1982), where Carter's sentence for violations of RICO
§ 1962(c) and § 1962(d) was reduced from 82 to 15 years through appellate proceedings, and
where Carter petitioned for extraordinary relief, alleging the parole commission denied her
equal protection and due process of the law.
15 Se notes 116-21 infra and accompanying text.
16 See notes 140-51 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 146-51 inra and accompanying text.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
This note examines the double jeopardy and verdict consistency
arguments raised in RICO prosecutions. Part II reviews the general
principles of greater and lesser included offenses. Part III discusses
the lesser included offense issue as it relates to each of the three pro-
tections afforded by the double jeopardy clause. It argues that since
the relationship between RICO and the predicate offenses is not
greater and lesser included, double jeopardy attacks should be re-
jected in RICO prosecutions.' 8 Part IV analyzes the issue of verdict
consistency. Since consistency of verdicts has never been required in
general federal jurisprudence, it is asserted that no different rule
ought to control jury verdicts in RICO prosecutions.' 9 To the degree
that RICO prosecutions present unique consistency problems, special
verdicts can be used to avoid them.20
II. Lesser Included Offenses--General Principles
The common law developed the doctrine of lesser included of-
fenses to aid the prosecution when it failed to prove some element of
the crime charged. 21 The courts soon recognized that the doctrine
also benefited the defendant since, if the jury desired to convict him
of sometiing, it had the option of finding him guilty of the lesser
offense. 22 For example, in a prosecution for auto theft, the jury could
decide that only a joyriding case was made. Because joyriding is
lesser included in the automobile theft charge, the jury has the power
to return a guilty verdict on joyriding alone. Similarly, the govern-
ment, although desiring a conviction for auto theft, may still obtain a
conviction against a defendant for the lesser included offense, even
when it failed to present the requisite proof of each element of the
crime charged in the indictment. 23
Today, rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
18 See notes 55-59 infia and accompanying text.
19 See notes 140-51 infia and accompanying text.
20 See notes 152-57 infra and accompanying text.
21 Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973). See also 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 515, at 372 (1969), and cases cited therein.
22 Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-13; See generally Comment,Jug, Instruclions on Lesser Included
Ofenses, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1962).
23 The joyriding (taking or operating a vehicle without the owner's consent) and auto
theft illustration was presented to the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977). Brown was convicted ofjoyriding, then subsequently convicted of auto theft.
The Supreme Court held these offenses to be greater and lesser included, and hence the
"same" offense under the Blockburger test. See notes 44-54 'nbfra and accompanying text. Be-
cause the double jeopardy clause prohibits successive prosecutions for the same offense,
Brown's auto theft conviction was reversed. 432 U.S. at 170.
[December 1982]
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governs lesser included offenses in federal courts.24 This rule pro-
vides: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the
offense charged or of an offense necessarily included therein if the
attempt is an offense."125
The key phrase in rule 31(c) is "necessarily included." The
Supreme Court of the United States has subtly encouraged a care-
fully reasoned analysis of whether one offense is necessarily included
in another. In lanelli v. United States,26 the appellant argued that 18
U.S.C. § 371,27 a general federal conspiracy statute, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955,28 a statute prohibiting illegal gambling businesses involving
five or more persons, were greater and lesser included. Because sec-
tion 1955 is silent regarding the necessity for concerted activity, the
essence of a conspiracy charge, the Court construed section 1955 to
permit the possibility that the five persons "involved" in the gam-
bling operation might not be acting together.29 Thus, the federal
statutes were not greater and lesser included.30
24 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
25 d
26 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
27 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both ....
28 18 U.S.C. § 1955 provides:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or owns all or
part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which-
(i) is a violation of .the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is
conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in
excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day ....
29 Section 1955 is part of Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The
Court characterized the Act as a "carefully crafted piece of legislation," then stated:
Had Congress intended to foreclose the possibility of prosecuting conspiracy
offenses under § 371 by merging them into prosecutions under § 1955, we think it
would have so indicated explicitly. It chose instead to define the substantive offense
punished by § 1955 in a manner that fails specifically to invoke the concerns which
underlie the law of conspiracy.
420 U.S. at 789.
30 Id at 791. The Court found that Congress had intended to retain § 371 and § 1955,
each as an "independent curb" available for use in the strategy against organized crime. Id
NOTES
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The Supreme Court upheld its lanelli decision inJefrs v. United
States.31 InJeffers, the appellants argued that 21 U.S.C. § 846,32 a
statute governing conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and 21 U.S.C..
§ 848,33 a statute proscribing continuing criminal enterprises, were
greater and lesser included. The Court held that the concerted activ-
ity requirement of section 848 "quite plausibly may be read to pro-
vide the necessary element of 'agreement' found wanting in [18
U.S.C.] § 1955 [in lanelli].' 34 The Court assumed for purposes of its
decision that the two offenses were greater and lesser included, but
found it unnecessary to definitively settle that issue.35 In addition,
the Court further demonstrated its careful treatment of rule 31(c) in
determining whether cumulative punishments were permissible for
violations of sections 846 and 848. In deciding this issue, crucial in
any determination of whether statutes are greater and lesser in-
cluded, the Court yielded to congressional intent. 36 The Supreme
Court of the United States has thus left the analysis of greater and
lesser included offenses quite flexible.
31 432 U.S. 137 (1977). Jeffers was involved in a highly sophisticated narcotics distribu-
tion network.
32 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any of-
fense defined in this subchapter [Control and Enforcement] is punishable by imprisonment or
fine which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commis-
sion of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
33 21 U.S.C. § 848 provides:
(a)(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and
which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than S 100,000, and to
the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2) ....
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
[Import and Export] the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter
or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a super-
visory position, or any other position of management, and,
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
34 432 U.S. at 148.
35 Id at 153 n.20. Before this case, it was not settled whether § 846 was a lesser included
offense of § 848. The Court refused to decide the issue, because Jeffers himself was solely
responsible for the successive prosecutions involved. Jeffers had objected to the Government's
motion for joinder before the first trial, and his objection was sustained. The Supreme Court
held that his action in expressly asking for separate trials deprived him of any double jeop-
ardy rights he might have had against the consecutive trials. Id at 154.
36 The Court concluded Congress did not intend to allow cumulative punishments for
violations of §§ 846 and 848. Id at 155.
[December 1982]
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III. Lesser Included Offenses and the Double Jeopardy Clause
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment affords three
protections: (1) protection after acquittal against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense, 37 (2) protection after conviction against a
second prosecution for the same offense,38 and (3) protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense.3 9 The clause is a rule of
finality,40 expressing the policy that the government must not unduly
harass the defendant or subject him to unnecessary expense.41
Courts have discovered that the concept of "same offense" does not
lend itself to a simple or precise definition.42 Nevertheless, courts
agree that greater and lesser included offenses are the "same offense"
for constitutional purposes under the double jeopardy clause.43
37 See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
38 Id
39 Id
40 The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy
clause was held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Where a defendant may be subjected to successive prosecu-
tions, the clause serves "a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit." United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 471 (1979) (plurality opinion).
41 In United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Supreme Court stated the policy
behind the double jeopardy clause as follows:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-Ameri-
can system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id at 187-88. See aL/o United States v. Crist, 437 U.S. 28, 39 (1978); Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 795-96 (1968).
42 Justice Rehnquist characterized the concept of "same offense" as "a phrase decep-
tively simple in appearance but virtually kaleidoscopic in application." Whalen, 445 U.S. at
700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), the Supreme Court held, "The greater offense
is therefore by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense in-
cluded in it." Id at 168.
Jeopardy attaches at an early stage in the trial. In nonjury trials, jeopardy attaches
when the first witness is sworn. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). In jury
trials, jeopardy attaches when the jury has been empaneled and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736-38 (1963).
The defendant who wishes to raise the double jeopardy defense must move before trial to
dismiss the indictment. The district court may then hold a pretrial hearing solely on this
issue. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). If the district court finds the double
jeopardy claim to be frivolous, the court must so state in writing. The defendant may appeal
the district court's decision, but an appeal from a denial of a double jeopardy motion does not
divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial. Rather, both the district court
NOTES
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A. The Blockburger Test
The leading Supreme Court case determining whether two of-
fenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes is Blockburger v.
United States.44 In Blockburger, the Supreme Court established the
"same evidence" test, which provides that conduct may constitute an
offense against two statutes only if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact that the other does not.45
The Supreme Court has recently refined and limited the scope
of Blockburger. In Whalen v. United States ,46 a divided Court47 held that
the Blockburger test was a rule of statutory construction, to be used to
determine whether Congress intended to create two offenses or one.4
The Court also stated that where two offenses are not the "same"
under the Blockburger test, the sentences imposed will run consecu-
tively.49 But where the offenses are the "same" under the test, cumu-
lative sentences are prohibited unless specially authorized by
Congress.50
and the court of appeals will have jurisdiction to proceed. United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d
934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982). 4
The trial judge may abort a criminal trial after jeopardy has attached without barring
retrial when "manifest necessity" requires, or when to do otherwise would "defeat the ends of
public justice." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The Supreme
Court has stated that a trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial (1)
when an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or (2) when a conviction could result but would
have to be reversed on appeal because of an obvious procedural error in the trial. Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). For an extensive discussion of "manifest necessity" and
its implications, see United States v. Mandel, 431 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977).
44 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
45 "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not." 284 U.S. at 304. The test emphasizes the elements of the two crimes. Thus, if each
offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwith-
standing a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes. lanelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
46 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
47 Opinion by Stewart, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. White con-
curred in part and concurred in the judgment. Blackmun concurred in thejudgment. Rehn-
quist and Burger dissented.
48 445 U.S. at 691.
49 Id at 693.
50 Id In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Blockburger test's application to statutes
similar to RICO. "[T]he Blockburger test, although useful in identifying statutes that define
greater and lesser included offenses in the traditional sense, is less satisfactory, and perhaps
even misdirected, when applied to statutes defining 'compound' and 'predicate' offenses."
445 U.S. at 708 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He believes that the legislature has the power to
provide for separate punishments under separate statutory provisions, even if the provisions
constitute the "same offense" under the Blockburger test. Id "[W]hen applied to compound
[December 1982]
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The Whalen opinion was augmented by the Supreme Court's
subsequeht decision in Albemaz v. United States.5I There, the Supreme
Court noted that the statutory language must be the starting point in
"same-separate" offense analysis. 52 The Court concluded that the
Blockburger test was designed to construe congressional intent. When
legislative intent is readily discernible, the Blockburger test does not
control.53 The Court recognized that the definition of offenses and
their corresponding punishments is a matter for the Congress. The
judiciary's task in this regard is to follow congressional intent.54
Thus, the Blockburger, Whalen, and Albernaz decisions establish
that where offenses are separate, under the Blockburger test or because
of express congressional intent, no constitutional limitation exists on
the prosecution of a defendant in successive trials and on his resul-
tant punishment.
B. RICO and the Predicates: Greater and Lesser Included?
Many defendants have argued that the RICO substantive of-
fenses and predicate offenses charged as substantive offenses are
greater and lesser included. Most courts have rejected this conten-
tion. The opinion in United States v. Hartley5 5 illustrates the present
and predicate offenses, the Blockburger test has nothing whatsoever to do with legislative
intent, turning instead on arbitrary assumptions and syntactical subtleties. . . .If the pole-
star in this case is to be legislative intent, I see no reason to apply Blockburger unless it
advances that inquiry." Id
51 450 U.S. 333 (1981). Opinion by Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Brennan, White,
Blackmun, and Powell. Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Mar-
shall and Stevens joined. The dissenting justices of Whalen joined the majority opinion in
Albernaz, thus strengthening the Albernaz holding as authority.
52 450 U.S. at 336. Quoting Consumers Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), the court said, "Absent a 'clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary,' that language [of the statute] must ordinarily be regarded as controlling." 450
U.S. at 336.
53 Id at 340. One commentator insists that Blockburger, and not Whalen or Albernaz,
should control in RICO cases. He argues that courts should determine whether multiple
punishments were authorized by Congress, but that double jeopardy analysis should not end
at this level. Rather, the court should further inquire, using Blockburger, whether multiple
punish;nents have been authorized for two offenses that are in fact the "same offense." See
Comment, supra note 14, at 741. However, this view ignores the status of Whalen andAlbernaz
as the law, although the author did recognize the Blockburger test as a rule of statutory con-
struction, and that Whalen and Albenaz limited the test to that purpose. Id at 740.
54 450 U.S. at 344. See also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 (1958).
55 678 F.2d 961 (1lth Cir. 1982). Hartley was a vice president of Treasure Isle, Inc., a
Florida corporation specializing in breaded seafood products. He was convicted of conspiring
to defraud the government by supplying shrimp that did not conform to designated military
specifications. The shrimp contained too much breading, were of inadequate size, and had
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analytical trend. In Hartley, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit admitted that the predicate offenses and the
RICO offenses failed to qualify as separate under the Blockburger
test.56 The court stated that the four substantive RICO offenses re-
quired proof of additional facts not required in proving the predicate
offenses, in that evidence of an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering
activity, and an effect on interstate commerce had to be demon-
strated. Nevertheless, under the Blockburger test, the predicate of-
fenses could not be considered separate offenses because they are
incorporated in full into the RICO substantive offenses. Arguably,
they had to be considered lesser included in the RICO offenses.57
Because the Blockburger test is merely a rule of statutory construc-
tion, however, it does not control where legislative intent clearly indi-
cates that the offenses are to be treated as separate and distinct. 58
The Hartley court found such intent in RICO's statutory framework
and language, and succinctly summarized, "[s]urely, Congress could
not have meant to eliminate the penalties for [the specific racketeer-
ing crimes] by incorporating them as evidence of a more organized
method of committing crime. In our opinion, Congressional intent is
clear." 59
Against this background, this note will next examine the three
not been properly cleaned. He was also charged and convicted under RICO § 1962(c). The
Eleventh Circuit wrote an amusing opinion in this case that is worth reading for both its
analysis and its humor.
56 678 F.2d at 991-92. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 743, where the author vigor-
ously asserts that RICO and the predicates are the same offense.
57 678 F.2d at 992. The procedural implication of characterizing predicate offenses as
lesser included involves the issue whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that the
predicate offense is lesser included. An instruction on a lesser included offense is proper only
where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element not
required for conviction of a lesser included offense. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343,
350 (1965). See also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (assault with intent to com-
mit serious bodily injury; simple assault instruction should have been given); United States v.
Brown, 551 F.2d 236, 239 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496, 500 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Carter, 540 F.2d 753, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1976).
Both the prosecution and the defendant may request that the lesser included offense be
charged. Keeble, 412 U.S. at 208. Moreover, reversible error may be committed if an in-
struction is given when there is no evidentiary dispute or another prerequisite is absent, or
when a request for an instruction is improperly denied. See general Keeble v. United States,
412 U.S. 205 (1973); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Berra v. United States,
351 U.S. 131 (1956).
58 678 F.2d at 992 (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981)).
59 678 F.2d at 992. The Eleventh Circuit found evidence that the legislature had in-
tended RICO and the predicate offenses to be separate in both the Statement of Findings and
Purpose, see note 2 supra, and the Supersedure Clause of RICO. The Supersedure Clause
states that "[n]othing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law
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protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause, generally, and in
relation to RICO prosecutions.
C. The Double Jeopardy Arguments
Defendants in RICO prosecutions have raised double jeopardy
arguments in three contexts: successive state and federal trials, 60 suc-
cessive federal trials,61 and multiple charges in a single trial imposing
multiple punishments.62  Challenges under these circumstances in
RICO prosecutions have generally been rejected. State and federal
governments may prosecute for the same or similar offenses, except
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in
this title." Pub. L. No. 91-95, § 904(b).
The Harliq court also relied on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hawkins,
658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981). In Hawkins, defendant Gerdes argued that substantive and
predicate RICO offenses are the "same offense" under the Blockburger test. The court rejected
this contention, stating that the Blockburger test is not a constitutional "litmus test" that deter-
mines when a sentence violates the double jeopardy clause. Rather, it is a rule of statutory
construction, and the essential inquiry is that of congressional intent. Id at 287. The Haw-
kins court discussed, but did not rule on, Blockburger's applicability. Id at 288. Instead, the
court distinguished predicate acts under RICO from the traditional greater and lesser in-
cluded offenses. Id The Fifth Circuit found clear intent that Congress wished to permit
cumulative sentences for RICO offenses and the underlying predicate offenses, relying on
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1981), and
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980), and
on the Statement of Findings and Purpose, the Supersedure Clause, and the Liberal Con-
struction Clause, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), which provides that "[t]he provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 658 F.2d at 287.
Most courts considering the greater and lesser included offense issue have agreed with
the Hartlhy conclusion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has aptly
stated, "The government is not required to make an election between seeking a conviction
under RICO or prosecuting the predicate offenses only," because this requirement would
nullify the congressional intent behind RICO's enhanced penal sanctions. United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
At least eight predicate activities have been held not to be lesser included in the RICO
substantive charges. These include wire fraud (United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981)); possession and concealment of property stolen from
interstate commerce (United States v. Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204 (M.D. Ga. 1981)); receipt
and disposal of counterfeit securities moving in interstate commerce (Hawkins, 516 F. Supp.
1204 (M.D. Ga. 1981)); mail fraud (United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1982),
United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), United States v. Lavin, 504 F. Supp.
1356 (N.D. I1. 1981)); Taft-Hartley violations (United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1982), United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)); extor-
tion (United States v. DeVincent, 632 F.2d 155 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1980));
arson (United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981)); and Travel Act violations
(Thordarson v. United States, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981)).
60 See notes 68-81 infra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 82-106 in/fa and accompanying text.
62 See notes 107-15 inra and accompanying text.
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where prohibited by statute,63 under the doctrine of dual sover-
eignty.r4 Moreover, since RICO substantive offenses are not the
"same offense" as the predicate offenses, the federal government may
prosecute them in separate trials without offending the fifth amend-
ment's ban against double jeopardy.65 Collateral estoppel issues do
arise, however, when the defendant is acquitted in the first trial.66
Finally, because congressional intent indicates that the RICO sub-
stantive and predicate offenses are neither the same nor greater and
lesser included, the government may seek punishment for both. 67
1. Successive Trials by State and Federal Governments
The double jeopardy implications of state and federal prosecu-
tions of a defendant for the same conduct may arise whether the de-
fendant is acquitted or convicted in the first trial.
a. The Dual Sovereignt Docthrie
Whether a defendant is acquitted or convicted in the first trial,
generally no double jeopardy concern arises upon a second trial by a
different sovereign. The double jeopardy clause does not bar two
sovereigns from prosecuting the same or a similar offense, regardless
of the sequence of the prosecutions,6 because the punished conduct
violates the peace and dignity of both sovereigns. 69 Under the "dual
sovereignty" doctrine, state and federal governments have prose-
63 See note 70 in/a and accompanying text.
64 See notes 68-70 in/a and accompanying text.
65 See notes 85-93 infa and accompanying text.
66 See notes 73 and 84 infa and accompanying text.
67 See notes 110-15 in/a and accompanying text.
68 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (state prosecution does not bar
subsequent federal prosecution for the same activity); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137
(1959) (federal prosecution does not bar subsequent state prosecution for the same offense).
The dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply to successive prosecutions by a state and a
subdivision thereof Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Nor does it apply to prosecutions
by a federal court and Indian tribal court, because these are considered to be the same sover-
eign. United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976).
69 In United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), the Supreme Court announced the
policy behind the dual sovereignty doctrine as follows:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable
of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. . . . Each gov-
ernment in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. It follows that an act de-
nounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the
peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.
260 U.S. at 387. The dual sovereignty doctrine was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ab-
bate v. United States, 359 U.S. at 195.
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cuted defendants in successive trials. Nevertheless, both the federal
government and some state governments, by policy and by statute,
have limited their ability to prosecute a defendant for the same
conduct.70
70 The following states have, by statute, limited the dual sovereignty doctrine: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-146 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656
(West 1965); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(c) (Smith-Hurd
1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-2-15 (Bums 1963); MINN. STAT. § 609.045 (1963); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 171.070 (1963); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 139
(McKinney 1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25 (West
1954); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.240(1) (1965); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 22-5-8 (1967); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 1323 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-25 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1958). This list
includes many of the most populous states of the union. Therefore, successive federal-state
prosecutions will rarely result today.
In the federal courts, the Attorney General has attempted to limit successive state and
federal trials through what is now known as the Petite policy. See Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529, 530-31 (1960), where the Supreme Court recognized this policy. See also Thompson
v. United States, 444 U.S. 248 (1980). This policy provides that, after a state prosecution, no
federal prosecution should ensue for substantially the same act. Any successive prosecution
must have the prior approval of an Assistant Attorney General, who will determine whether
the federal prosecution will serve "compelling interests of federal law enforcement." 444 U.S.
at 248.
Moreover, when the Solicitor General concedes that the Petite policy has been violated
by failure to obtain authorization for the federal prosecution, he will urge the court to vacate
the judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to reverse the indict-
ment. Id at 249. The Supreme Court has consistently responded to such requests by grant-
ing certiorari and vacating the judgments. Id. (citing, e.g., Hammons v. United States, 439
U.S. 810 (1978); Frakes v. United States, 435 U.S. 911 (1978); Rinaldi v. United States, 434
U.S. 22 (1977), and other cases dating back to the Petite decision in 1960). The Supreme
Court will also vacate judgments in other cases that the Solicitor General represents violate
other Justice Department policies. 444 U.S. at 250. Thus, the Supreme Court would argua-
bly reverse a conviction that violated the RICO guidelines.
In United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), the defendants argued that
their indictment ought to have been dismissed as violative of the Petite policy against multiple
prosecutions for the same transaction. The court rejected this argument because, although
the Petite doctrine describes the Justice Department's internal position that successive indict-
ments will not ordinarily be based on the same conduct, the policy is not reviewable by the
courts except in extraordinary circumstances. Id at 1215 (citing United States v. Snell, 592
F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979), and United States v. Welch,
572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978)).
The Attorney General's RICO guidelines similarly limit the federal government's ability
to prosecute successively under RICO. The guidelines provide that no RICO count should
be charged where the predicate acts consist solely of state offenses, except where (1) the fed-
eral government has a significant interest; (2) significant organized crime involvement exists;
or (3) where the prosecution of significant political or governmental individuals may pose
special problems for local prosecutors. RICO GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 4. The Attorney
General added that this policy underscores the principle that the prosecution of state crimes,
except in the circumstances above, is primarily the responsibility of state authorities. Id See
also The Prosecution Function, supra note 14.
Although the policy of the RICO guidelines could not be used by the accused as a de-
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b. RICO and Successive State-Federal Trials
The dual sovereignty doctrine has generally been followed in
successive RICO prosecutions on federal and state levels. 71 The lead-
ing case is United States v. Frumento.72 In Frumento, a Philadelphia
court tried and acquitted defendants for bribery, extortion, and con-
spiracy to accept bribes and avoid payment of the Pennsylvania ciga-
rette tax. The subsequent federal indictment involved the same
activity as the state prosecution, and charged the defendants with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), by conducting the affairs of the Penn-
sylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes through a pattern
of racketeering activity. The district court rejected the defendant's
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel claims.73
The defendants argued on appeal that, even though bribing a
state official is not a federal crime, the RICO statute makes commit-
ting a pattern of state offenses a federal crime. They claimed that
such a construction gives the federal courts jurisdiction to try state
offenses and, therefore, violates the double jeopardy clause.74 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this
argument.
The court noted that RICO forbids racketeering, not the com-
mission of state offenses per se. The court continued that the state
offenses referred to in the federal act are definitional only, while rack-
fense, a showing by the defendant of the prosecutor's utter disregard of the guidelines may be
used as the basis of a discriminatory or vindictive prosecution charge. See note 14 supra. See
also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1215-16. In addition, as noted above, a RICO
prosecution in violation of the RICO Guidelines may be dismissed when the Solicitor General
so requests.
71 See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962
(1979). In Aleman, the Seventh Circuit noted that the dual sovereignty doctrine remains the
law, but pointed out that the doctrine cannot be used merely as a "cover and a tool" of
federal authorities. 609 F.2d at 309. The court added that state officials do not defer per-
forming their own obligations because federal officials may possibly pursue the interstate as-
pects of the crime in the future. Id
72 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
73 United States v. Frumento, 409 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Frumento first argued
that Abbate and the dual sovereignty doctrine were no longer valid. The district court flatly
rejected this argument. Id at 140.
Frumento then argued that the collateral estoppel doctrine ofAshe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970), barred his prosecution. In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that, if an essential
element of the subsequent criminal charges was determined in the defendant's favor in the
previous proceeding, as with a verdict of acquittal, the government may not reprosecute. Id
at 443. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only when both proceedings involve the
same parties. Since state and federal governments, as separate sovereigns, are not the same
party, the district court rejected the collateral estoppel argument. 409 F. Supp. at 140.
74 563 F.2d at 1086-87.
[December 19821
[Vol. 58:382]
eteering, the federal crime, is defined as a matter of legislative drafts-
manship by reference to state law crimes. 75  The Third Circuit
followed the Supreme Court's dual sovereignty decision in Abbate v.
United States,76 where the Court discussed the strong policies behind
the doctrine.77 Even though the conduct charged in the federal court
involved the same operative facts considered at the state level, an
additional element of unique significance to the federal courts was
present-"the effect of the state operation on interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 78 The Fnrmento decision
remains viable precedent. 79
In United States v. Aleman,80 the Seventh Circuit faced the situa-
tion where one has been convicted at the state level and subsequently
75 Id at 1087. Section 1961(1) of RICO, see note 7 supra, incorporates offenses "charge-
able under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." The majority
in Frumento interpreted this language to require only that the conduct on which the federal
charge is based be typical of the type of serious crime dealt with by the state statute. The
majority did not require the particular defendant be "chargeable under State law" at the
time of the federal indictment. Id at 1087 n.8A.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Aldisert argued that, at the time of the federal indictment,
the defendants' activities were neither "chargeable" nor "punishable" under state law, be-
cause they had already been charged under state law and were acquitted. Because they had
been acquitted, they could not be punished. "Therefore, since the federal definitional statute
requires that the racketeering offense be both chargeable and punishable under state law, the
government could not, and did not, prove all the elements necessary under the federal stat-
ute." Id at 1097 (emphasis in original). Thus, this was a case of legal impossibility of per-
formance. Id See also Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling ofthe Prosecutor's Nursery, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 265, 266 (1980).
The majority position in Fruento is better reasoned. Section 1961(1) is definitional only,
and RICO does not punish the same conduct as do state laws. As the majority noted, "The
gravamen of section 1962 is a violation of federal law, and 'reference to state law is necessary
only to identify the type of unlawful activity in which the defendant intended to engage.'"
563 F.2d at 1097 (citing United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971)) (emphasis in
original). "Chargeable and punishable under state law" simply defines which state offenses
are incorporated into RICO: not misdemeanor offenses, but only those offenses sufficiently
serious to invoke federal concern when the other elements of a RICO violation are present.
76 359 U.S. 187 (1959). In Abbate, the Supreme Court held that a state conviction does
not bar a subsequent federal prosecution for the same activity. The defendant again argued
that the dual sovereignty doctrine was no longer accepted. The Third Circuit held otherwise,
noting that Abbate has been routinely followed by the circuit courts since 1959, and that the
Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari. 563 F.2d at 1088.
77 563 F.2d at 1088.
78 Id
79 The dual sovereignty doctrine disposed of defendants' double jeopardy arguments in a
few other RICO prosecutions. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (federal prosecution following a state conviction); United States v.
Solano, 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980) (both a federal and a state
prosecution before the RICO prosecution); and United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748
(5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1978) (federal prosecution following a state acquittal).
80 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
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prosecuted for a RICO violation arising from the same activity. In
Aleman, the appellant Fonesta was convicted under Indiana law for
robbery. Fonesta alleged this conviction was a factor in a subsequent
prosecution for RICO conspiracy, RICO § 1962(c), and transporting
stolen goods. In upholding Fonesta's federal conviction, the court
relied on the dual sovereignty doctrine, and noted that since a single
act of the accused may impinge upon both state and federal interests,
both sovereigns may prosecute. 81
2. Successive Federal Trials
As in successive state and federal trials, double jeopardy impli-
cations concerning successive federal trials may arise both when the
first trial ends in acquittal and when it ends in conviction.
If the defendant was acquitted in the first trial, the government
may not reprosecute for the "same offense" or a greater or lesser in-
cluded offense.82 This principle also applies when a defendant is con-
victed in the first trial.83 But the government may prosecute in a
successive trial where the offenses charged are not the same, subject
to the collateral estoppel considerations previously mentioned. 84
a. RICO and Successive Federal Trials
Because RICO substantive and predicate offenses are not
greater and lesser included, courts have generally upheld successive
federal prosecutions where the first trial involved predicate offenses
and the second trial involved a RICO substantive charge. In United
States v. Philh's,85 the defendant argued that the government may
not try multiple RICO predicate offenses, then later use those convic-
tions to prove the RICO substantive charge.8 6 The Fifth Circuit re-
sponded that "[t]his contention misunderstands the nature of
81 609 F.2d at 309. The court did note that a state prosecution may not be used "merely
as a cover and tool of federal authorities," id, but found no federal "orchestration" in the
record. Id. See note 71 supra.
82 Two trials for the same offense are prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. See note
40 supra.
83 Id
84 See note 73 supra. Because successive federal trials involve identical parties, the defend-
ant may raise collateral estoppel after a verdict of acquittal at the first federal trial. In United
States v. Meinster, 475 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1979), the court recognized that acquittal on
a federal aiding and abetting charge precluded the government from introducing as evidence
any fact necessarily resolved against the government at the first trial. Id at 1097.
85 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981).




Congressional intent dictates that RICO and its predicates are
separate and distinct. Thus, the court held that a defendant could
properly be convicted for the predicate acts that form the pattern of
racketeering activity basic to the RICO charge, and later be prose-
cuted under RICO.8 8 The Phillips decision is consistent with general
double jeopardy principles, in that successive federal prosecutions do
not offend the fifth amendment's ban on double jeopardy when the
offenses tried are not the "same offense." 89
Similar double jeopardy arguments were rejected in United States
v. Brook/ier.90 In Brooklier, the appellants plead guilty to a RICO con-
spiracy charge, then were indicted a few years later for a RICO
§ 1962(c) violation. One activity instrumental in the prior conspir-
acy charge supplied a basis for the substantive RICO charge. The
appellants moved to dismiss the alleged activity from the indictment
on double jeopardy grounds. The Ninth Circuit denied the motion
pursuant to the Blockburger test.9' The court stated that, if the appel-
lants had not been indicted and convicted previously, the govern-
ment could have charged them with both the RICO conspiracy and
the substantive RICO offense, each based partly on the same extor-
tion activity, in the same indictment. 92 Thus, since the offenses were
separate, the prior conviction did not bar a subsequent prosecution
for a substantive RICO violation based in part on the same
87 Id. The Court noted that RICO's legislative history demonstrates congressional intent
to permit cumulative sentences for both the RICO offenses and the underlying predicate
offenses. See also United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Boylan, 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1981).
88 664 F.2d at 1009 (citing United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir.),cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020
(1980)). A RICO conviction does not grant immunity for the predicate acts of racketeering
activity. 664 F.2d at 1009.
89- See note 82 supra.
90 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982). The court began its opinion with, "Appellants are
members of La Cosa Nostra, a secret organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering
activities, including murder, extortion, gambling, and loansharking." Id at 1213. During
this trial, the government presented evidence that since 1972, appellants extorted money from
pornographers and bookmakers. Id.
91 Id. at 1215. The district court first denied the motion, and defendants filed an inter-
locutory appeal. The district court's decision was affirmed in United States v. Brooklier, 637
F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1980). In the present case, the court declined to modify its interlocutory
decision. 685 F.2d at 1214.
92 The Court found that the Blockburger test permitted the government to charge the
defendants with two or more offenses arising from the same transaction when each offense has
distinct elements. Id at 1214.
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activity.93
b. Non-RICO Conspiracies Charged as Predicate Ofenses
Where successive federal trials and the RICO statute are in-
volved, the use of a non-RICO conspiracy conviction as a predicate
offense is at issue in two situations: (1) use of the conspiracy in a later
RICO substantive offense prosecution, and (2) the use of the conspir-
acy in a later RICO conspiracy prosecution.
The courts and commentator who have considered these ques-
tions agree that a non-RICO conspiracy conviction may be used as a
predicate offense in a subsequent RICO substantive offense charge.94
The Fifth Circuit noted in Philh'ps that "conspiracy may properly be
alleged as a predicate act of racketeering under RICO when it in-
volves any of the substantive offenses listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (1)(D). ''95
The issue whether a non-RICO conspiracy can be used as a
predicate offense in a subsequent RICO conspiracy prosecution is
more complex. In Braverman v. United States,96 the Supreme Court
stated that one agreement generally equals one conspiracy, regardless
of the number or diversity of its objectives. But where the conduct in
question violated two separate conspiracy statutes, the Supreme
Court, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,97 permitted conviction
under both statutes, even though the defendants made only one
agreement. 98
At the district court level, in United States v. Phii's ,99 the govern-
93 Id at 1215 (citing United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1020 (1980)).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); Tarlow, supra
note 75, at 261.
95 664 F.2d at 1015 (citing United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The Second Circuit in Weisman relied on RICO's statutory language. Section 1961(1)(D)
defines "racketeering activity" as "any offense involving" bankruptcy or securities fraud or
narcotics. The court felt that this language was broad enough to include conspiracies to
commit these offenses. 624 F.2d at 1123.
96 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942).
97 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
98 Id at 788. In American Tobacco, petitioners argued that only one conspiracy, namely a
conspiracy to fix prices, existed. The Supreme Court noted the existence of separate statutory
offenses: a conspiracy in restraint of trade, proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman Act; and a
conspiracy to monopolize, proscribed by § 2 of the Sherman Act. The court applied the
Blockburger test to §§ 1 and 2, and held the conspiracies were "reciprocally distinguishable
from and independent of each other although the objects of the conspiracies may partially
overlap." Id The court upheld the convictions under both conspiracy statutes.
99 United States v. Meinster, 475 F. Supp. 1092, 1096 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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ment conceded that double jeopardy considerations stemming from a
previous section 846 conspiracy trial precluded a second prosecution
for RICO conspiracy. The district court and at least one commenta-
tor have agreed with the government's position. 100
Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have upheld RICO
conspiracy convictions that followed convictions for conspiracy to
distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In United States V.
Smith,"1" the Fifth Circuit found differences in the elements of both
conspiracy statutes and permitted the imposition of separate
sentences. 10 2 Similarly, in United States v. Solano,1°3 the Ninth Circuit
.rejected a double jeopardy argument because section 846 and section
1962(d) involve different elements. 10 4
Since the RICO conspiracy offense is a separate offense from
other conspiracies, and because at least two statutes are involved
when a RICO conspiracy prosecution follows a non-RICO conspir-
acy conviction, successive prosecutions appear to raise no double
jeopardy problems according to American Tobacco Co. v. United
States. 105 Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits employed the Blockburger
test when evaluating the conspiracy statutes. Congressional inten-
tion to separate a RICO conspiracy from all other conspiracies which
may be predicate acts of racketeering might settle the question in the
future, without the use of the Blockburger test. 0 6
100 Id at 1095. See also Tarlow, supra note 75, at 261 n.251. For the text of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, see note 32 supra.
101 574 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
102 The court noted that to convict for a RICO conspiracy, the Government must prove,
in addition to the enterprise's nexus with interstate or foreign commerce, the objective mani-
festation of an "agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise
through the commission of two or more predicate crimes." 574 F.2d at 311 (citing United
States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978)). The RICO conspiracy and § 846 drug conspir-
acy share one common element, an agreement, but the resemblance ends there. 574 F.2d at
311. Because the two statutes satisfied the Blockburger test, the court held a defendant may
properly be convicted under both. Id Finally, the court noted that a single criminal conspir-
acy, like a single criminal act, can constitute two or more separate offenses, and Congress can
mandate punishment for each offense without violating the double jeopardy clause. Id
103 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 440 U.S. 1020 (1980).
104 Id at 1145. The Ninth Circuit employed the B/ockburger test to study the elements of
the two conspiracies.
105 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See note 98 supra.
106 No case has yet to consider whether a § 371 conspiracy can be charged as a predicate
act of racketeering in a RICO conspiracy prosecution. See note 27 supra. In United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980), the court noted that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371
were not listed as predicate acts of racketeering in § 1961. The court believed that only con-
spiracies to commit the offenses of § 1961 (1)(D) could be predicate acts of racketeering, be-
cause the offenses of subsections (b) and (c) require the act be indictable under specifically
enumerated sections of the criminal code. 624 F.2d at 1123.
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3. Multiple Punishment for Multiple Charges in a Single Trial
The final protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause is
that against multiple punishments for the "same offense."' 1 7 Impos-
ing successive punishments for different and distinct offenses raises no
double jeopardy implications. 0 8 Since RICO and the predicate of-
fenses are separate and not greater and lesser included, most courts
have held that consecutive punishments may be imposed.'0 9
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed this issue in United States v. Hart-
e,." 0 . There, the court began with the premise that the double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits cumulative sentences for the "same offense"
unless such sentences are specially authorized by Congress."' The
court found that Congress manifested its intent in RICO's Statement
of Findings and Purpose" 2 and in its Supersedure Clause." 3 Because
Congress authorized cumulative punishments for substantive RICO
offenses and the underlying predicate crimes, the court held the
Blockburger test for statutory construction did not apply. 1 4 Most
other courts considering the double jeopardy argument in the con-
text of consecutive punishments have reached the same conclusion." 5
107 See note 37 supra.
108 See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (no violation of
the double jeopardy clause to impose consecutive sentences for a RICO count and mail fraud
counts which also serve as racketeering acts in the RICO count); United States v. Martino,
648 F.2d 367, 383 (5th Cir. 1981) (although RICO substantive and conspiracy charges in-
volve considerable overlap in evidence, the double jeopardy clause is not automatically in-
voked); United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 413 (6th Cir. 1981) (Congress may
constitutionally make the commission of two crimes within a specified period of time and
within the course of a particular type of enterprise an independant criminal offense punish-
able more severely than simply twice the penalty for each constituent offense); United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979) (the court found consecutive sentences for § 1962(c) and
§ 1962(d) convictions permissible, relying on Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 770));
United States v. Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204, 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (possession and conceal-
ment of property stolen from interstate shipment and disposal of counterfeit securities as
RICO predicate offenses are not precluded from consecutive sentencing in addition to RICO,
because the pattern of racketeering activity included proof of other offenses).
110 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982).
Ill Id at 991. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980). See also notes 46-50
supra and accompanying text.
112 678 F.2d at 992. See note 2 supra.
113 678 F.2d at 992. See note 59 supra.
114 678 F.2d at 992.
115 See note 109 supra. One commentator believes that RICO's legislative intent as to
multiple punishment is less clear than the courts have suggested. He finds neither the en-
hanced sanctions of the Statement of Findings and Purpose, the Supersedure Clause, nor the
Liberal Construction Clause persuasive. Comment, supra note 14, at 737. Most circuit courts
that have addressed this issue disagree. See note 109 supra. For a good discussion, see United




The relationship between RICO substantive and predicate of-
fenses also arises in the context of verdict consistency. The value of
consistency at trial and on appeal is significant in the consideration
of RICO verdicts. 1 6 Because the jury does not normally specify
which two predicate offenses have satisfied the "pattern" require-
ment when more than two such offenses are charged, it may be un-
clear whether the jury in fact found the requisite pattern of
racketeering activity to obtain the RICO conviction. 17 General fed-
eral jurisprudence permits inconsistency in verdicts and discourages
judicial speculation concerning the jury's decision. 8 Since the jury
is presumed to have followed the court's instructions,1 9 a guilty ver-
dict on a RICO substantive charge suggests that the jury indeed
found the required pattern of racketeering activity.
The consistency question must also be considered when an ap-
pellate court's reversal of a predicate offense charged as a substantive
crime raises the possibility that the court has thereby removed one of
the two offenses relied upon by the jury to establish the pattern of
racketeering. Although courts are divided as to whether the RICO
conviction need be reversed, 20 the better-reasoned opinions have de-
cided the RICO conviction may stand.' 2'
A. General Rules of Verdict Consistenc
At common law, jurors took an oath to well and truly try the
case, and their verdict was considered sacrosanct. 22 Since trial by
jury developed as an alternative to the ancient methods of compur-
gation 23 and ordeal, 24 the jury was to be considered no more "ra-
tional" than the ordeals the jury had replaced. Just as one did not
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 81 Stat. 941 (1970) (allowing both the
government and the accused to appeal the sentences imposed under RICO).
116 See notes 122-39 infra and accompanying text.
117 If the jury returned a verdict of acquittal on one predicate offense and a guilty verdict
on the RICO offense, the offense of which the defendant was acquitted may have been one of
the two offenses necessary to prove the pattern of racketeering. This situation has been troub-
lesome for appellate courts. See notes 140-51 infra and accompanying text.
118 See notes 137-39 infia and accompanying text.
119 See note 132 inra and accompanying text.
120 See notes 140-43 infla and accompanying text.
121 See notes 144-51 infia and accompanying text.
122 See United States v. Maybury, 273 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1960), for a discussion of
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question the judgments of God in the ordeal, one did not challenge
the jury's verdict. 25 Since consistency has never been a requisite at-
tribute of a jury verdict, 26 the jury could convict a defendant on one
count of a multiple-count indictment and acquit him on another
count, even when committing one crime without committing the
other might have been impossible.
Today, rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gov-
erns verdicts in federal courts. 127 The verdict must be unanimous, 2 8
certain, 29 and returned in open court; 30 these requirements may not
be waived. 31 The jury is presumed to have performed its fact-find-
ing function and is presumed to have followed the court's instruc-
tions in the law.' 32
Neither rationality nor consistency is required of the verdict1 33
or of the counts in an indictment. 134 Each count in the indictment is
to be treated as a separate indictment for jury deliberation pur-
poses. 35 Finally, sufficient evidence to support the verdict must be
present. 3
6
125 The Supreme Court has noted that ignoring inconsistencies in a jury's disposition of
the counts of a criminal indictment may be the price paid for securing the unanimous verdict
that the sixth amendment requires. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948). The
Maybugy court added that "[t]he vogue for repetitious multiple count indictments may well
produce an increase in seemingly inconsistent jury verdicts, where in fact the jury is using its
power to prevent the punishment from getting too far out of line with the crime." 274 F.2d at
902.
126 See Harris v. Rivera, 102 S. Ct. 460 (1981); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390
(1932).
127 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31. Section (a) provides: "The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall
be returned by the jury to the judge in open court."
128 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). Federal law does not require the states to have unanimous
verdicts. Apodaco v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972).
129 Glenn v. United States, 420 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(verdict must be set
aside if its meaning is unalterably ambiguous); United States v. DiMatteo, 169 F.2d 798, 801
(3d Cir. 1948)(jury is to return pertinent, adequate, and coherent verdict).
130 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
131 United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 197 8)Gury unanimity cannot be
waived); United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 1978)(reversible error for dis-
trict court to allow defendant to waive unanimous verdict requirement).
132 Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 618-19 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1964);
Donaldson v. United States, 248 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 922 (1957).
133 Harris v. Rivera, 102 S. Ct. 460 (1981); United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943).
134 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100-01 (1974); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 393-94 (1932).
135 Battsell v. United States, 403 F.2d 395, 400-01 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1094
(1969); Aggers v. United States, 366 F.2d 744, 747-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1010
(1966).
136 In United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit stated that
an appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is strictly limited. The
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In Dunn v. United States,137 the Supreme Court held that jury ver-
dicts need not be consistent. 38 The Court noted, that while a verdict
may have resulted from jury compromise or leniency, "verdicts can-
not be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters."'139
Since consistency is not required of the jury verdict, and since
the jury is presumed to have followed the court's instructions, it is
reasonable in a RICO prosecution to assume that the jury found the
requisite pattern of racketeering activity. Furthermore, reversal of a
RICO conviction upon an acquittal, or the reversal of one of the
predicate offenses charged as a substantive offense, would involve un-
warranted and unwelcome intrusion into the jury's deliberations.
B. RICO and Verdict Consisteng
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Pamess, 40 agreed that the reversal of a predicate of-
fense did not justify interfering with the jury's deliberations. Milton
Parness was convicted of interstate transportation of stolen property
(two counts), causing a person to travel in interstate commerce in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud (one count), and a RICO
§ 1962(b) violation. The court decided that a conviction of any two
of the three alleged acts of racketeering was sufficient to establish the
necessary pattern of racketeering activity, and sustain a RICO con-




In United States v. Brown,t42 the Third Circuit was unpersuaded
by the Parness logic. In Brown, the defendants were convicted of ex-
jury verdict will be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable
to the government, to support it. Id. at 648. Thus a jury could convict on one count of the
indictment and acquit on another count, even if the evidence was the same for both counts,
and even if the defendant could not have committed one crime without committing the other.
Id
137 284 U.S. 390 (1932). The three-count indictment charged the defendant with (1) a
common nuisance by keeping liquor for sale at a specified place; (2) unlawful possession of
intoxicating liquor; and (3) unlawful sale of liquor. The jury found the defendant guilty only
on the first count, but the court held that consistency in the verdict was not necessary because
each count in an indictment reads as if it were a separate indictment. Id at 393.
138 Id at 393. Inconsistent verdicts may result from jury leniency or compromise, or may
be the price paid for unanimity. See notes 122-25 supra. Juries are supposed to reflect the
people's opinion on a given issue, which opinion is rarely consistent or rational. Id The logic
of the jury verdict should not be analyzed. United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.
1974).
139 284 U.S. at 394.
140 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974).
141 Id at 438.
142 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cart. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). The trial court charged
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tortion, three counts of mail fraud, a RICO § 1962(b) violation and a
RICO § 1962(d) violation. The appellate court reversed two counts
of mail fraud for insufficient evidence, then reversed the RICO con-
victions. Because the jury might have relied on either of the two later
reversed mail fraud counts in finding the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity, the court determined the RICO convictions must fall.143
As a general rule, consistency is not required of verdicts. Noth-
ing in RICO's text or its legislative history suggests that a different
rule should govern RICO verdicts. 1" If the courts impose a consis-
tency requirement upon RICO verdicts and the verdicts of the predi-
cate offenses charged as substantive offenses, they would make the
RICO statute unduly complex and perhaps unmanageable, would
clearly violate the established rule that inconsistency is permissible,
and would damage or risk damaging the congressional policy of en-
hanced penal sanctions in RICO prosecutions.1 45
The Brown decision suggests a procedure for courts to follow
when convictions relating to one or more substantive offenses have
been reversed. According to the Brown court, courts must attempt to
determine whether a reasonable certainty exists that the jury found a
sufficient connection between the remaining predicate offenses and
the RICO offense.' 46 Although this holding authorizes judicial in-
the jury that a finding of guilt under any of the substantive counts could support a conviction
under RICO § 1962 (b) or § 1962(d). 583 F.2d at 669.
143 583 F.2d at 669-70. The court could not determine upon which substantive counts the
jury based its RICO convictions. In reversing the RICO convictions, the court relied on
United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976). In Dansker, the jury had returned a
guilty verdict on a count of conspiracy with two objectives. The appellate court determined
that insufficient evidence existed to sustain a conviction as to one objective, and reversed the
guilty verdict on the conspiracy count. Id at 51-52.
144 The statute is silent on verdict consistency.
145 Had no RICO action been charged, each count would have been treated as a separate
indictment. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393. United States v. Dunn mandates that no consistency
between indictments or verdicts is required. Id The inclusion of a RICO count should not
affect this conclusion. In Harris v. Rivera, 102 S. Ct. 460 (1981), the Supreme Court reiter-
ated, "[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not a suffticient reason for setting it aside." Id at 464
(emphasis added). The court recognized that it had so held regarding inconsistency between
verdicts on separate charges against a single defendant and regarding verdicts that treat code-
fendants in a joint trial inconsistently. Id
146 583 F.2d at 669. In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second
Circuit was faced with the Brown argument, but declined to decide whether the RICO con-
viction should be reversed. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on sev-
eral counts and argued that, under Brown, if any counts that might form the pattern of
racketeering activity were reversed, the entire RICO conviction must be reversed. The Huber
court indicated there were two sides to the Brown argument, one being the Parness approach.
Id at 339.
In United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980),
[December 1982]
[Vol. 58:382]
quiry into jury deliberations and requires consistency in jury verdicts,
the court offered no authority to support its significant departure
from established jurisprudence. 47
The Third Circuit recently faced a consistency problem similar
to that it faced in Brown. In Bojfa v. United States ,148 Eugene Boffa was
convicted of a RICO § 1962(c) and a RICO § 1962(d) violation,
based on ten mail fraud violations, five Taft-Hartley violations, and
one obstruction of justice charge. The appellate court reversed all
ten mail fraud violations, but upheld the RICO convictions because
they were supported by the six remaining predicate acts.149 This
Third Circuit panel neither followed nor cited the previous Third
Circuit decision in Brown.°50 Because substantial practical and his-
torical reasons exist for not requiring consistent verdicts, Brown ap-
pears to have been incorrectly decided.15'
C. Elimination of the Problem: Special Verdicts
One solution to fuse the split in the circuits regarding the need
for verdict consistency is to eliminate the consistency issue altogether
by using special verdicts in RICO prosecutions. Special verdicts,
though generally discouraged in criminal law as an intrusion upon
the jury's functions, 152 are sanctioned for use in criminal forfeiture
the Second Circuit rejected the Brown argument. The court held that the jury could not have
rationally concluded that the conspiracies to commit bankruptcy and securities fraud oc-
curred in the conduct of the defendant's affairs, without also finding that the substantive
offenses also took place in the conduct of the defendant's affairs. Thus, even without the
conspiracy counts, the jury verdict conclusively established a RICO violation. Any error in
the inclusion of the conspiracy counts in the RICO charge was harmless. The court discussed
the Brown decision, but also referred the reader to Pamess. Id at 1124-25.
In United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1979), the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant's acquittal for conducting an illegal gam-
bling business was not inconsistent with a guilty verdict based on the defendant's use of the
lounge to conduct a gambling business through a pattern of racketeering activity or, in the
alternative, in the collection of gambling debts. 583 F.2d at 1134.
In United States v. Peacock, 675 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), several arsons, a murder, and
23 counts of mail fraud were predicate acts for a § 1962(c) conviction. One arson count and
the murder count were reversed, but the court upheld the RICO conviction, assuming that at
least two other acts were related to the affairs of the arson enterprise. Id at 248. The court
stressed that only two acts of racketeering relating to the enterprise need be shown for a
§ 1962(c) conviction. Id at 352.
147 583 F.2d at 669-70.
148 688 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1982).
149 Id at 934.
150 The Third Circuit panel in Bojfa was not the same panel that decided Brown.
151 See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). See notes 126-38 supra and ac-
companying text.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
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cases under rule 31 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.153
The RICO statute mandates criminal forfeiture, 154 and rule 31(e)
was devised to implement the RICO criminal forfeiture provision. 55
The jury should be asked to return with its general verdict a
special verdict indicating which counts comprised the pattern of
racketeering activity. "Several courts have successfully used this ap-
proach thus far. 56
Special verdicts would clarify the trial verdict, would aid the
appellate courts in analyzing RICO cases, and would benefit poten-
tial litigants of RICO civil suits by clarifying parties and issues.
Moreover, special verdicts would cure problems caused by general
verdicts relating to issue preclusion. 157
V. Conclusion
The relationship between the RICO substantive and predicate
offenses is crucial to the application of the statute. Congress mani-
fested its intention that RICO and its predicates be separate offenses.
The circuit courts of appeals have recognized and implemented this
intent by holding that the predicate offenses are not lesser included
in the RICO charge, and by recognizing that the traditional Block-
burger test is inapplicable to RICO prosecutions.
Because RICO and the predicate offenses are not greater and
D'Looney, 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 1337 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
153 FED R. GRIM. P. 31(e) states: "If the indictment or the information alleges that an
interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to
the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any."
154 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Forfeiture is mandatory, while fines and imprisonment are discre-
tionary. One's interest in the enterprise is forfeited so as to be compatible with the rights of
innocent parties.
155 Subdivision (e) was intended to provide procedural implementation of the criminal
forfeiture provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX, § 1963. "Although
special verdict provisions are rare in criminal cases, they are not unknown." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 31(e) (committee comments).
156 In United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), a special verdict indicated that
the jury had found the appellants guilty on all of the racketeering acts alleged in the indict-
ment (three murders and two acts of extortion). In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d
Cir. 1979), the court used a special verdict to determine which corporations were included in
the enterprise, and the percentage of appellants' interest in each. The appellants challenged
the first of these inquiries under rule 31 (e), but the court stated that stipulating a percentage
without designating the object of the percentage would be useless. See also United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
157 A directive by the jury indicating its exact findings would aid victims in their subse-
quent civil suits. "A prior criminal conviction may work an estoppel in favor of the victim in




lesser included, the courts have generally rejected double jeopardy
claims in RICO prosecutions. Thus, successive state and federal tri-
als, successive federal trials, and consecutive punishments are not
constitutionally prohibited in RICO cases.
This conceptualization, on the part of the courts, of the legal
relationship between RICO and its predicate offenses in the lesser
included offense/double jeopardy context has not been recognized,
however, when these same courts have examined the relationship in
the verdict consistency context. The better reasoned opinions permit
a RICO conviction to stand after an appellate court's reversal of a
predicate offense charged as a substantive offense. These courts ac-
knowledge that general federal jurisprudence does not require consis-
tent verdicts, and that this general rule ought to apply to RICO
prosecutions. Many courts are using special jury verdicts to avoid the
unique consistency problems created by RICO prosecutions. This
trend in the use of special verdicts is a favorable one.
Karen j Ciupak
Addendum
The United States Supreme Court recenty held that the double jeopardy
clause's prohibition against multiple punishment for the same ofense does not
prohibit imposition, at a single trial, of cumulative convictions and punishments
for two or more statutorily defined offnses that, while constituting the same
crime under the Blockburger test, are speciftally intended by the legislature to
carry separate punishments. Missouri v. Hunter, 51 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4096
(U.S. Jan. 18, 1983). The Hunter opinion further strengthens the Whalen
and Albernaz opinions, thus supporting the conclusion that consecutive punish-
ments may constitutionaly be imposed for convictions of RICO substantive and
predicate offenses. See notes 44-54 supra.
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